In this paper, we view the demand for reinsurance as a "special case" of the more general problem of the corporate demand for risk management. We analyze the extent to which reinsurance purchases by the global property-liability insurance industry vary across countries and assess the relative importance of country-level factors compared with firm-level factors. Our results indicate that after controlling for firm-level factors, country-level factors have economically as well as statistically significant effects upon the demand for reinsurance.
popular strategy for addressing this problem has been to study risk management decisions within the context of specific industries where data on corporate risk management decisions are more readily available, e.g., Tufano's (1996) study of hedging in the North American gold mining industry, Jin and Jorion's (2006) study of hedging in the U.S. oil and gas industry, and the Mayers and Smith (1990) study of reinsurance purchases by U.S. property-liability insurance companies come to mind. In the case of the insurance industry, reinsurance purchases by insurance companies are systematically reported in developed countries as well as in many developing countries, so data availability is not a problem compared with other industries. Furthermore, since a rich variation in risk-taking occurs within a single industry, the insurance industry provides a nearly ideal laboratory setting for studying the corporate demand for insurance (cf. Mayers and Smith, 2013) . Following Mayers and Smith (2013) , we view the demand for reinsurance as a "special case" of the more general problem of corporate demand for insurance.
Previous empirical research on the demand for reinsurance typically relies upon data from a single country (usually either the United States or the U.K.; cf. Mayers and Smith, 1990; Shiu, 2011) and focuses attention upon identifying firm-level determinants of the demand for reinsurance. However, reinsurance demand may be affected not only by firm-level characteristics but also by country-level factors. Indeed, corporate capital structures of nonfinancial firms and insurance firms have been shown to depend not only upon firm-level, but also upon country-level factors (cf. Gungoraydinoglu andÖztekin, 2011; Altuntas, Berry-Stölzle, and Wende, 2014) . Given the complementarity between capital structure and risk management decisions (cf. Froot, 2007; Shiu, 2011) , we examine whether country-level characteristics also have an effect upon the demand for reinsurance. In particular, we include measures of insurers' access to financial markets, since improved access to external funding facilitates raising capital and lowers the demand for alternative risk management methods such as reinsurance.
Furthermore, transaction cost theory (cf. Williamson, 1985) suggests that a firm's institutional environment impacts its optimal contract structure. Thus, institutional factors such as the state of a given country's capital market development also likely affect the demand for reinsurance.
We examine whether the demand for reinsurance differs for insurers domiciled in "rich" compared with "poor" countries; e.g., if the consumers of one country are richer on average than consumers from another country, then consumers in the richer country may not place as high of a value upon the insurer solvency benefits of reinsurance compared with consumers in the poorer country, cet. par.
1 Furthermore, we include proxies for how risky the various countries' business environments are; higher political risk (in the form of an unfavorable business environment) increases the incentive for insurers to use "rented" capital in the form of reinsurance in lieu of equity capital. We expect that insurers domiciled in countries with a higher degree of exposure to catastrophic risks will demand more reinsurance than insurers domiciled in less exposed countries, cet. par. (cf. Cummins, Doherty and Lo, 2002; Grace, Rauch and Wende, 2014) . We include proxies for each country's quality of regulation and governance. The purpose of these proxies is to calibrate the effectiveness of the government in formulating and implementing sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development. We also include measures of the extent to which local insurance markets are competitively structured in order to determine how public policy and competition influence risk management incentives for insurers.
Using a dataset consisting of 21,702 firm-year observations from 33 (developed and developing) countries during the period 2000-2012, we contribute to the risk management literature by providing evidence of country-level factors which affect the demand for reinsurance in addition to firm-level factors that have been found to influence reinsurance demand in previous research. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the first to analyze the effect of country characteristics on insurers' risk management strategies. Furthermore, since the vast majority of large corporations own captive insurance subsidiaries, our research also has implications for the risk management strategies of non-financial corporations (cf. Adams, Hardwick, and Zou, 2008) . Finally, our research provides important insights for reinsurers as they contemplate country-level strategies and potential market entries.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss the role of reinsurance in the insurance industry. In the third section, we describe the data and methodology that we use for our empirical analysis, and present the firm-and country-level factors that we include in our analysis. In the fourth section, we present the results. Concluding remarks are provided in the fifth and final section of the paper.
The Role of Reinsurance in the Insurance Industry
Reinsurance is insurance purchased by one insurer from another insurer. The company that buys reinsurance is commonly referred to as the ceding insurer, or cedant, and the company that sells reinsurance coverage is the reinsurer. Thus, the cedant "cedes" reinsurance to the reinsurer.
Reinsurance plays a critically important role in the risk management strategies of insurers.
Insurers manage risks by relying upon the law of large numbers, in that they issue a large number of policies whose losses for the most part are uncorrelated with each other, thus causing aggregate claims to become more predictable than they otherwise would be (cf. Bernard, 2013) . This reduces the variance of the insurer's cash flows, thus allowing the insurer to more accurately determine its capital requirements. However, circumstances may arise in which adequate diversification of risk may be difficult to achieve, thus limiting the efficacy of traditional risk pooling arrangements. For example, losses from natural and manmade catastrophes do not follow the law of large numbers since they are (by their very nature) highly correlated. Insurers can transfer these risks to reinsurers and thereby reduce their risk exposure and capital requirements, allowing them to accept a larger number of risks with the same amount of capital (cf. Bernard, 2013) . Besides enhancing insurers' capital position, reinsurance also enables insurers to smooth earnings and reduce regulatory compliance costs (cf. Adiel 1996) . Moreover, reinsurance can be used to reduce corporate tax payments and to mitigate agency and bankruptcy costs (cf. Mayers and Smith, 1982 times the economic value of the "option to default" for long-tailed lines and 20 times for short-tailed lines. Thus, reinsurance can increase the insurer's reliability by increasing the insurer's level of safety. This in turn strengthens consumers' confidence that their claims will be paid, which benefits the insurer by enhancing the market value of policies that it issues.
In contrast to the individual's decision to purchase insurance, a widely-held firm's demand for insurance cannot be adequately explained by shareholder risk aversion, since shareholders can effectively eliminate insurable risk by holding diversified asset portfolios (cf. Mayers and Smith, 1982) . Thus, the empirical reinsurance literature has focused attention on factors other than risk aversion of corporate owners. For example, Mayers and Smith (1990) analyze the determinants of reinsurance demand for U.S. property-liability insurers, focusing in particular on taxes, expected bankruptcy costs, investment incentives and optimal risk sharing. Adams (1996) performs a similar analysis of the determinants of reinsurance demand for New Zealand life insurers. Adams, Hardwick, and Zou (2008) Katrishen and Scordis, 1998) . Furthermore, we focus our attention in this study on the demand for reinsurance by property-liability insurance firms. Since the vast majority of previous (single-country) reinsurance empirical studies make use of data from the propertyliability insurance industry (cf. Mayers and Smith, 1990; Garven and Lamm-Tennant, 2003; Cole and McCullough, 2006; Shiu, 2011; work by Adams (1996) 
Variance Decomposition Analysis of Firm-Level Determinants and Country Fixed Effects
The analysis is split into three parts. First, we conduct a variance decomposition analysis to assess the importance of firm-level determinants of insurer's demand for reinsurance relative to time-invariant country fixed effects. Since we are interested in modeling the reinsurance demand of ceding insurers, we need to account for the differences in the reinsurance decisions of group-affiliated insurers compared with those of unaffiliated insurers, as the former can be regarded as transactions in internal capital markets (cf. Powell and Sommer, 2007) . 8 Therefore, we control for the issue of group affiliation by conducting a variance decomposition analysis for the entire sample, for affiliated insurers only, and for unaffiliated insurers only. This allows us to examine whether the explanatory power of firm-level determinants relative to country-fixed effects change due to affiliation.
The analysis is based upon a reduced form model of reinsurance demand:
from Tables 4 and 5 are not sensitive to the choice of random seeds.
7 Even if we drop countries with fewer than 100 firm-year observations from our sample, our main results from Tables 4 and 5 remain stable. However, we would lose 545 firm-year observations from 7 countries.
where i indexes firms, j indexes countries and t indexes years, Reinsurance ij,t is the ratio of reinsurance ceded to the sum of reinsurance premiums assumed plus direct premiums for firm i in country j and year t, 9 X ij,t−1 is a set of one-year lagged firm-level explanatory variables, D ij are country dummies, D t are year dummies and ε ij,t is a random error term.
A standard analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) allows us to decompose the variation in reinsurance demand attributed to each explanatory variable. We follow Lemmon, Roberts, and Zender (2008) and compute the fraction of the Type III partial sum of squares of a specific variable relative to the model sum of squares to measure how much variation in reinsurance demand is explained by the variable. To examine firm-and country-specific variables which may explain differences in reinsurance demand across insurers, we use reinsurance as the dependent variable in our model (cf. Shiu, 2011).
Although we are primarily interested in documenting the extent to which country-level factors affect the demand for reinsurance, we also control for other firm-level determinants of the demand for reinsurance that have been documented by previous empirical studies. Thus, we include measures of profitability, leverage, size, underwriting risk, long-tail business, premium growth, taxes, organizational form and group affiliation. 10 Profitability might affect the demand for reinsurance since more profitable insurers have more funds to counter financial risks and should therefore rely less on reinsurance than less profitable firms (cf. Adams, Hardwick, and Zou, 2008) . On the other hand, it may be that long-term contracts 9 This particular definition for ceded reinsurance is used throughout the empirical reinsurance literature (cf. Mayers and Smith, 1990; Garven and Lamm-Tennant, 2003; Cole and McCullough, 2006; Shiu, 2011; Garven, Hilliard and Grace, 2014) . In theory, it should be bounded from below at 0 and from above at 1; in practice however, temporal mismatches in income flows can cause these lower and upper bounds to be breached (cf. Mayers and Smith, 1990, p. 24; Shiu, 2011, p. 480) .
10 A detailed definition of the variables included in our analysis can be found in the Appendix.
between reinsurers and insurers separate profitable from non-profitable insurers (cf. Garven, Hilliard, and Grace, 2014) , so that one would expect to find a positive relationship between the rate of profit and the demand for insurance. Hence, the expected effect is ambiguous. In order to control for the relationship between profitability and the demand for reinsurance, we include the insurers' profitability as measured by return on equity, i.e., the ratio of after-tax earnings to equity.
We include a measure of financial leverage, since reinsurance is a substitute for equity (cf. Garven and Lamm-Tennant, 2003) which enables insurers to reduce the expected costs of financial distress (cf. Adams, Hardwick, and Zou, 2008) . We measure leverage by calculating the ratio of direct premiums written to equity.
To capture the effect of larger risk pools, we include a measure of size, as financial distress costs do not increase proportionally with the company's size (cf. Warner, 1977) , indicating that small insurers should buy relatively more reinsurance (cf. Adams, Hardwick, and Zou, 2008) . Moreover, larger insurers are more likely to be able to self-insure (cf. Adams, 1996) .
We measure the insurers' size as the natural logarithm of total assets.
Other things equal, insurers operating in more volatile lines of business have a greater need for reinsurance than insurers which underwrite lower volatility policies (cf. de Haan and Kakes, 2010) . In other words, insurers with a high underwriting risk should demand more reinsurance, as insurance firms that engage in risky business activities should have uncertain future cash flows than insurers with less risky activities (cf. Lamm-Tennant and Starks, 1993) . Hence, following Adams (1996) , we include the standard deviation of insurers' loss ratio over the sample period in the model. Underwriting risk is measured by the standard deviation of the ratio of net claims incurred to premiums earned.
The type of products offered likely affect the demand for reinsurance. In so-called longtail business lines (e.g., medical malpractice insurance in the U.S.), it can take many years before claims are settled and paid (cf. Born, Viscusi, and Baker, 2009 ). Since a firm that is heavily exposed to long-tail business typically holds relatively large reserves compared with premiums, less reinsurance should be required in order to cover future claim payments.
On the other hand, if tail length increases risk ex ante and this impairs ex post welfare of policyholders, the insurer may be incentivized to purchase more reinsurance as a way to bond its relationship with policyholders. In order to empirically measure the relationship between tail length and reinsurance demand, we include long-tail business, the ratio of the firm's total reserves to its premiums, as an explanatory variable.
We include a measure of premium growth in our analysis; Shiu (2011) argues that insurers with larger growth opportunities (as proxied by premium growth) demand more reinsurance in order to hedge growth opportunities against unexpected shocks that might force them to raise costly external capital or to forgo projects. Moreover, previous papers indicate that aggressive growth strategies are often associated with increases in insurer risk which in turn increases the risk of insolvency (cf. Kim, Anderson, Amburgey, and Hickman, 1995) .
Building on Smith and Stulz (1985) , several papers indicate the importance of taxes for the firms' demand for risk management. For insurers that face convex tax schedules, the use of reinsurance mitigates the volatility of taxable income, thereby reducing the expected value of future tax payments (cf. Adams, Hardwick, and Zou, 2008) . Given the importance of tax convexity, several papers include proxies for tax convexity in their analysis (cf. Adams, Hardwick, and Zou, 2008; Garven, Hilliard, and Grace, 2014; Shiu, 2011) . Our proxy for tax convexity is a variable called tax ratio which is calculated as the ratio of the insurer's effective tax rate to its country tax rate. To the extent that tax schedules are convex, higher values for tax ratio imply greater tax convexity. Thus, the higher the tax ratio variable, the greater is the incentive to purchase reinsurance.
There are two primary organizational forms in the insurance industry: stock insurance companies and mutual insurance companies. 11 Empirically, these organizational forms are known to differ with respect to line-of-business mix (cf. Cummins, Weiss, and Zi, 1999) , risk appetite (cf. Lamm-Tennant and Starks, 1993) , and capital structure policies (cf. Harrington and Niehaus, 2002; Cheng and Weiss, 2012) . Hence, the demand for reinsurance likely varies according to how ownership is defined. On one hand, a mutual insurer may demand more reinsurance than an otherwise identical stock insurer since it lacks direct access to the capital markets (cf. Adams, Hardwick, and Zou, 2008) . On the other hand, by separating the ownerpolicyholder relationship 12 , a stock insurer would likely encounter worsened risk shifting and underinvestment incentives compared with an otherwise identical mutual insurer. Thus, stock insurers would likely demand more reinsurance in order to mitigate agency problems that exist between owners and policyholders (cf. Shiu, 2011) . We control for the effects of differences in ownership structure by including an indicator variable equal to 1 for mutual insurers and 0 otherwise.
We include an indicator variable for group affiliation in the model. 13 On the one hand, an insurer group can diversify risks within the group allowing each subsidiary to operate with higher capital buffer. On the other hand, however, insurer groups can strategically decide not to support a financially struggling subsidiary and let it default. Since potential clients 12 Obviously, the mutual ownership structure merges the owner-policyholder roles, which mitigates potential agency problems which would otherwise exist when these roles are separated as in the case of the stock ownership structure (cf. Garven, 1987) .
13 While several studies (cf. Mayers and Smith, 1990; Garven and Lamm-Tennant, 2003) screen out affiliated insurers from their analysis as they might bias the results by shifting profits within the group, Cole and McCullough (2006) include them in their analysis. While these studies focus on the insurers demand for reinsurance only, we argue that affiliation should not affect the firms' choice of risk management, using reinsurance demand as a proxy for corporate risk management demand to test the relative importance of country-level factors. Hence, the demand for risk management should not differ between affiliated and unaffiliated insurers. Therefore, we follow Cole and McCullough (2006) and include affiliated insurers in our analysis after conducting tests that this will not bias our results. This procedure is discussed in the results section.
shopping for insurance coverage are aware of this default option, they request discounts or do not buy from group insurers unless these insurers have substantial capital (cf. Sommer, 1996) . Therefore, the need for reinsurance coverage may be greater for affiliated insurers.
Insurers that are affiliated with insurance groups commonly cede and assume reinsurance with other group affiliates, as well as other "external" insurers that exist outside of the group.
Since internal reinsurance may either complement or substitute for external reinsurance, we include a group indicator equal to 1 if the insurer is a member of a group, and 0 otherwise.
Quantifying the Impact of Specific Country-Level Factors on Reinsurance Demand
The second part of our analysis focuses on specific country characteristics rather than country fixed effects. To examine the explanatory power of these country-level factors for firms' reinsurance demand levels, we include these country-level factors in a reduced form model of insurer reinsurance demand and perform a variance decomposition analysis. The business environment in a given country may not just have a level effect on the demand for reinsurance of all insurers operating in that country, but may also moderate the relationship between firm-level factors and reinsurance. To capture any indirect effects of country characteristics on firms' reinsurance demand, we include interaction terms between all firm-level variables and the country-level factors into the model. The specification of the model is as follows:
where i indexes firms, j indexes countries and t indexes years, X ij,t−1 is the set of one-year lagged firm-level variables from Equation (1), Y ij,t−1 is a specific country-level institutional factor, γ ij,t−1 is the institution-firm interaction effect, and ε ij,t is a random error term.
Note that we estimate Equation (2) separately for each country-level measure hypothesized to impact insurer's reinsurance demand, following Gungoraydinoglu andÖztekin (2011) and Altuntas, Berry-Stölzle, and Wende (2014) . The following section discusses our measures of (1) access to financial markets, (2) economic wealth, (3) riskiness of business environment,
(4) quality of regulation and governance and (5) competition in detail (a summary of the variable definitions can be found in the Appendix). Some of these measures are not available for all 33 countries and all sample years. Therefore, the number of observations used varies slightly across the different models.
Given that reinsurance is a substitute for leverage (cf. Shiu, 2011) , the firms' access to financial markets affects their demand for reinsurance. However, firms' access to financial markets depends on the size, efficiency and level of development of these markets. Since firms can access financial markets to raise external financing as buffer in case of unexpected loss events, we include measures of the countries' market capitalization, country credit rating, and corporate transparency. A more efficient and larger capital market implies better access to funding and thus a lower demand for reinsurance. In smaller and less efficient capital market environments, even large and financially healthy firms might struggle to raise external capital (Altuntas, Berry-Stölzle, and Wende (2014) 
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We use savings and socio-economic conditions in our analysis to proxy for differences in the various countries' economic wealth. Dynan, Skinner, and Zeldes (2004) empirically show that savings rates and lifetime income are strongly positively correlated; thus we use savings (expressed as a percent of GDP) as a proxy for the wealth endowment of an average consumer in a given country. Assuming that consumers have decreasing absolute risk aversion, this implies that the willingness to purchase (actuarially unfair) insurance will be lower for consumers in rich compared with poor countries, cet. par. Essentially, higher endowed wealth serves as a substitute for insurance, which in turn makes reinsurance less attractive.
Similar arguments can be applied in the case of the socio-economic conditions variable. This variable provides a measure of socio-economic well-being of a given country's consumers, taking into account unemployment, confidence, and poverty. Hence, this variable provides an additional proxy for wealth, and it has been empirically shown to be related to risk aversion (cf. Paravisini, Rappoport and Ravina, 2012).
The firms' risk management strategy can be affected by the riskiness of its business environment, i.e., the country's political risk, the occurrence of natural catastrophes in a given country and the degree of control of corruption and government effectiveness. In particular, the country's political risk might affect the insurers' demand for reinsurance as firms prefer to do business in politically stable environments. Bartram, Brown and Stulz (2012) find that political risk increases firm risk by making firms more vulnerable to shocks that are difficult to mitigate; hence such firms' cash flows feature correspondingly higher levels of idiosyncratic volatility. Acemoglu et al. (2003) argue that countries with high levels of political risk suffer from extractive, weak institutions, leading to weak constraints on politicians and political elites and thus less sustainable policies. Thus, insurers that are domiciled in such countries are subject to political risk and are likely to demand more reinsurance, other things equal. Therefore, we include a political risk variable developed by the International Country Risk Guide in order to ascertain the effect of political risk on the demand for reinsurance.
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Other things equal, insurers that are domiciled in catastrophe-prone countries naturally have a greater demand for reinsurance than insurers domiciled in countries where this is not the case. Hence, we include the number of events caused by natural forces in a given year in the country 18 as property-liability insurers in a given country with a high number of catastrophes tend to be more endangered by their effects and thus require larger amounts of reinsurance in order to cope with the financial consequences of natural disasters.
We include measures of the various countries' control of corruption and government effectiveness. These variables have similar influences as the political risk variable, in that better control of corruption and higher government effectiveness likely produces more favorable business environments, which in turn render risk mitigation techniques such as reinsurance less necessary. Moreover, investors may require higher levels of risk management in worse environments in order to ensure an adequate level of safety for their investments. Hence, we expect a negative relationship between these two measures and the insurers' demand for reinsurance.
We include four measures of the countries' quality of regulation and governance. institutions and bureaucracy are relatively unaffected by political pressure. This provides more stable environments, in which the insurers' promises to provide coverage in the future are more reliable. This in turn reduces the need for reinsurance, leading to a lower demand for reinsurance in countries with higher institutional strength.
We also include a measure of regulatory quality, an index that captures the government's ability to implement sound policies and regulations in a given country. Such policies might result in relatively efficient and safe companies that rely less on reinsurance than firms in countries with low regulatory quality. In case of less business-friendly regulatory environments, firms might rely more on reinsurance to decrease the risks they face in this environment in order to attract customers. In addition, the enforcement of contracts can be costly for firms, in particular if this process lasts for a longer time period, as it is associated with high legal and transaction costs. This is particularly important for reinsurance transactions, which are complex and individual transactions. Hence, firms want to avoid entering complex contractual agreements if they cannot be assured that they will be honored in the future.
Therefore, we include a measure of contract enforceability and expect that if enforceability of contracts is high, firms are more likely to engage in those transactions, indicating higher reinsurance demand.
A given country's tax rate may affect the demand for reinsurance. Garven and Loubergè (1996) show that in a reinsurance market where tax rates differ across countries, high tax rates create underwriting capacity constraints. Consequently, insurers that are domiciled in high tax rate countries augment their underwriting capacity by ceding risks to reinsurers that are domiciled in in low tax rate countries. Therefore, we include a variable called country tax rate (measured by the share of a country's commercial profits paid out in taxes) and expect (based upon the Garven and Loubergè (1996) model) a positive relationship between the demand for reinsurance and the country tax rate.
A given country's insurance market development may also affect the demand for reinsurance. We use two measures for the level of competition in a given country. Based upon game theoretic models of oligopolistic competition, market concentration can be viewed as an inverse measure of competition because market concentration facilitates tacit collusion and leads to prices above competitive levels (cf. Tirole, 1988) . Thus, we use the market share of the five largest insurers in a given country to capture differences in industry concentration and competition. We expect that insurers operating in less competitive market settings will likely demand less reinsurance compared with insurers operating in more competitive market settings, since insurers have greater incentives to respond to consumer demands for solvency under these circumstances. Our broad set of countries also allows us to explore competitive differences between emerging and developed insurance markets, since competition is typically more robust in developed markets compared with emerging markets. Hence, we use insurance penetration as an inverse measure of development of the insurance market. Insurance penetration is calculated as the ratio of a country's aggregate insurance premium volume to GDP. Firms operating in less developed insurance markets may be inclined to demand more reinsurance, as they might not have the same amount of risk-bearing capital as firms operating in more developed markets. Hence, ceding risks to a reinsurer can increase the insurer's underwriting capacity in its early development stages. Furthermore, firms operating in more developed insurance markets may have access to alternative risk transfers and risk management techniques that are not available to firms operating in less developed insurance markets. Hence, we expect a negative relationship to exist between insurance penetration and the demand for reinsurance.
A Multivariate Regression Model of Reinsurance
The variance decomposition analysis from Equation (2) is based upon a static model and provides results on the explanatory power of each country factor relative to firm-level variables on reinsurance demand. However, we are also interested in the signs and significance levels of coefficients related to each country-level factor. Our multivariate analysis is performed using ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions for each country factor. The regression analyses focus on whether specific country-level factors enhance or reduce the de-mand for reinsurance. Following previous reinsurance studies (Shiu, 2011; Cole et al., 2007) , we conduct ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with the following model specifications:
where i indexes firms, j indexes countries and t indexes years, X ij,t−1 is the set of one-year lagged firm-level explanatory variables from Equation (1), Y ij,t−1 is a specific country-level institutional factor, and ε ij,t is a random error term.
All independent variables are lagged by one year to mitigate potential endogeneity (Shiu, 2011) . Standard errors are adjusted for firm-level clustering. 19 In all regression models, year-dummies and country-fixed-effects are included. We recognize that there may be a potential endogeneity problem in our model. Specifically, an insurer's capital structure policy may affect its demand for reinsurance, so there may also be reverse causality (going from reinsurance back to capital structure) in our model. Thus, estimations by ordinary least squares (OLS) can create biased results. 20 To control for the endogeneity problem 19 To avoid bias in our standard errors due to within-firm correlation across time, we adjust standard errors for firm-level clustering. Petersen (2009) writes that "Cluster standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity" (p. 438) and standard errors clustered by firm "are robust to any form of within-cluster correlation" (p.459). We also test for multicollinearity among the explanatory variables in the models using variance inflation factors (VIFs). The mean VIF in all regression models is well below the benchmark of 10, indicating that multicollinearity does not appear to be a concern (cf. Belsley et al., 2005, and Chatterjee et al., 2013) .
20 If leverage is not exogenous (uncorrelated with the error term), then OLS estimates of its effect on reinsurance will be biased and inconsistent. We use a regression-based Hausman test for the exogeneity of leverage and reject the null hypothesis of exogeneity. More precisely, we test for the exogeneity of leverage using the procedure described in Wooldridge (2002, pp. 118-124) . First, we regress leverage on an instrument set (we use the same instrument set of variables as described for the two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach) and all other independent variables listed in Equation (3). We then include the residuals from the leverage regression as an additional independent variable in a regression of reinsurance on leverage and all other independent variables. The t-statistic associated with our generated regressor is sufficiently large to reject and for robustness, we include estimation of Equation (3) using a two-stage least squares (2SLS) approach. 21 The first stage of the 2SLS approach entails regressing leverage on the other independent variables in Equation (3) and a set of instruments that do not appear in Equation (3). In the second stage, Equation (3) is estimated using the predicted values for leverage obtained in the first-stage regression.
22
Instrumental variables must satisfy two conditions (cf. Wooldridge, 2002) . The first condition, instrument relevance, requires that the instruments have a high partial correlation with leverage. The second condition, instrument validity, requires that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term in Equation (3). Instrument relevance is tested using a
Wald test for the joint significance of the excluded instruments. The null hypothesis under the Wald test is that the instruments are jointly insignificant. To test for the validity of the instrument variables, we conduct a Sargan-test of overidentifying restrictions. The null hypothesis under Sargan-test is that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error term.
Four variables meet both the relevance and validity conditions: the natural logarithm of the null hypothesis of exogeneity at the 1 percent level. We conduct this procedure for all regression models in Table 5 .
21 Shiu (2011) uses this technique in the context of reverse causality from reinsurance to leverage in the UK insurance market. As an additional estimation strategy, he uses the Fixed-Effects Vector Decomposition (FEVD) approach of Plümper and Troeger (2007) . However, we desist from using the FEVD approach, since current econometric literature on the fixed-effects vector decomposition reveals that the "third stage"
of the FEVD estimator has no effect on the coefficient estimates, but is used to generate the standard errors (cf. Breusch et al., 2011) . The correct (IV) standard errors become understate, leading to the incorrect conclusion that the results are more statistically significant than they actually are. Breusch et al. (2011) writes that "... there is no need for "vector decomposition" and no distinct estimator to call FEVD. With appropriate justification for the instruments, FEVD is just IV. Without that justification, FEVD is just mistaken" (p.165).
equity capital, asset growth, annual inflation rate, and growth in gross domestic product. 
Empirical Results

Univariate Results
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for country-level characteristics and the demand for reinsurance over the period 2000 through 2012. Statistics regarding the amount of reinsurance ceded are reported for the full sample of insurers. It can be seen that the demand for reinsurance varies substantially across insurers from different countries in our analysis.
Moreover, the table indicates a high degree of variation of country-level characteristics for the sample of countries included in our analysis. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for firm-level characteristics for the full sample, as well as for sub-samples consisting of firms with levels of reinsurance below and above the sample median. This allows us to examine factors that are associated with higher demand for reinsurance on a global scale. Simple comparisons of means and medians indicate that insurers with reinsurance ratios above the sample median appear to be less profitable, more leveraged, exposed to greater volatility, and write shorter-tail lines of business compared with insurers with reinsurance ratios below the sample median. Similar comparisons also indicate that mutuals and unaffiliated insurers appear to purchase less reinsurance compared with stock and affiliated insurers.
Multivariate Results
In light of our earlier discussion concerning how reinsurance decisions of group-affiliated insurers might be regarded as internal capital market as opposed to pure risk transfer transactions, we examine whether our regression analysis (Equation (3)) yields comparable results 23 Campa and Kedia (2002) suggest an instrument set composed of current, lagged, and historically averaged measures of firm characteristics, industry growth, and general economic growth. Therefore, we include lagged values of firm characteristics (natural logarithm of equity capital and asset growth) and combine it with lagged values of economic growth variables (annual inflation rate and growth in gross domestic product).
for the full sample and the subsamples of affiliated and unaffiliated insurers. While some studies (cf. Mayers and Smith, 1990; Garven and Lamm-Tennant, 2003) screen out affiliated insurers from their analysis as they might bias the results, Cole and McCullough (2006) include them in their analysis. Table 3 shows the results for both the full sample and the two subsamples. It can be seen that the direction of the impact of the firm specific factors is consistent with the theoretical predictions for most factors. We find statistically significant effects for return on equity, leverage, size, std. dev. of loss ratio, long-tail business, mutual and group. Furthermore, the directions and levels of significance are the same for the full sample and the subsamples of affiliated and unaffiliated insurers. 24 These types of firms are also comparable with respect to the effect of country and year fixed effects: while country and year fixed effects explain around 59.32% and 0.68% of the variation of the demand for reinsurance for affiliated companies, they explain about 67.97% and 0.64% of the variation of unaffiliated firms. The difference might be due to the role of internal capital markets for affiliated firms. Given that these regression results indicate a large degree of similarity between affiliated and unaffiliated firms, we follow Cole and McCullough (2006) and include both types of firms in our analysis, including a dummy variable for group affiliation to capture differences between these subsamples.
Moreover, we wish to examine the explanatory power of individual country-level factors that are hypothesized to affect the demand for reinsurance; i.e., the degree to which these factors are able to explain variations in insurers' demand for reinsurance. Table 4 presents the results of a variance decomposition analysis for all country-level determinants from the 24 The mutual variable is negative for affiliated firms while it positive for unaffiliated firms. This finding is probably due to the fact that mutuals do not have direct access to external capital and rely more on other forms of risk management if they are unaffiliated. However, if they are subsidiaries of a stock company, they have access to internal capital markets and therefore demand less reinsurance. For tax ratio, we only find a statistically significant effect for affiliated firms, a result which would be consistent with the parent company relying upon reinsurance between affiliated as a method for managing the parent's overall tax liabilities.
categories access to financial markets, economic wealth, riskiness of business environment, quality of regulation and governance and competition in addition to the firm-level factors.
Our analysis aims to identify which individual factors affect insurers' demand for reinsurance in a country and the strength of that effect compared to firm-level factors. Furthermore, our analysis can identify whether specific categories are more important determinants of the demand for reinsurance than other categories. Table 4 shows that leverage, size, long-tail business and group affiliation in particular appear to affect the demand for reinsurance, depending on the moderating effect of the respective country-level factor. Overall, our results indicate that direct and indirect effects related to country-level factors strongly influence the demand for reinsurance; on average, these country-level factors explain more than 50% of the variance of the demand for reinsurance, whereas firm-level variables explain less than 50%. This finding is important when evaluating reinsurance demand for insurers from different countries, given the large impact of country-level factors on the decision to purchase reinsurance.
Regarding the country-level determinants, factors from the category access to financial markets strongly affect the insurer's demand for reinsurance, explaining between 59.54% and 71.99% of the variance. From the economic wealth category, the savings variable affects the demand for risk management to a lower extent (31.78%), whereas socio-economic conditions explain about 57.17% of the variance. The riskiness of business environment category is also quite important, as the variables which fall under that category explain between 35.89% and 67.85% of the variance. The results for quality of regulation and governance vary strongly depending on the respective factor, ranging between 30.27% and 70.03%. Factors from the competition category have a relatively low effect (16.14% and 19.43%). Hence, we find that well-functioning capital markets and good business and regulatory environments in particular affect the demand for reinsurance, while the development of the insurance market and the consumers' economic wealth appear to be of minor importance. 
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For factors from the access to financial markets (market capitalization, country credit rating and corporate transparency) categories, all significantly affect the demand for reinsurance in ways that are consistent with theory; e.g., market capitalization and country credit rating are inversely related to the demand for reinsurance, whereas higher corporate transparency is associated with a greater demand for reinsurance. These findings demonstrate the importance of well-developed capital market environments for the demand for reinsurance,
given that capital is a substitute for reinsurance and thus provides important evidence for reinsurers regarding their services in different capital market environments.
Factors from the category economic wealth also affect the demand for reinsurance significantly and, in line with the theoretical predictions, negatively. However, our results indicate that the savings variable is a relatively weak factor for the insurers' risk management strategy, compared with other factors such as the country's capital market development.
We also find significant results for the category riskiness of business environment that are consistent with the theoretical predictions. Natural catastrophes (positively), political risk, and measures of control of corruption and government effectiveness (negatively) all show the predicted effects and are significant in our analysis. This provides evidence of the important role of the governmental environment and other factors that affect the risk of the 25 In Table 5 , the row labeled "Institution" refers to the country-level factor listed in the column heading.
26 For the 2SLS approach, we conduct a Wald test for the joint significance of the excluded instruments, as described above. The Wald test is significant at 1% level in all regression models. We also perform a fixed- firms' environments for the mitigation of firm risk, leading to lower incentives to purchase reinsurance in countries with sound business environments. It also indicates the crucial role of sector-specific events like natural catastrophes for the risk management of propertyliability insurers, given their impact on insurance firms (cf. Lamb, 1995; Cummins, Doherty and Lo, 2002) and hence additional need for risk management.
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Regarding quality of regulation and governance, our results indicate that most variables are statistically significant and in line with the theoretical predictions; e.g., countries with high levels of institutional strength and regulatory quality typically have safer insurers which rely less upon reinsurance than insurers located in countries with low levels of institutional strength and regulatory quality.
The country tax rate variable is not statistically significant in our analysis. Thus, Garven and Loubergè's (1996) tax-based theory for reinsurance trade is not empirically supported in our study. However, we do find that higher levels of contract enforceability lead to higher demand for reinsurance. This supports the view that reinsurance transactions are more likely to occur when contracts are reliably enforced.
Regarding competition, we find statistically significant negative effects for insurance penetration and for market concentration. This implies that when local insurers have market power, they purchase less reinsurance. However, as shown in Table 4 , the explanatory power of these variables is low compared with other country-level factors.
Overall, our results indicate that country-level factors which capture the country's macro-27 In addition to our "Number of catastrophes" variable and for robustness purposes, we use two alternative natural catastrophe measures and run our regression models on reinsurance demand. The alternatives are:
(1) A ratio of number of cat events in a given country to total number of cat events worldwide for a given year, and (2) a ratio of total number of losses in USD to number of cat events in a given country for a given year. The results from Tables 4 and 5 remain stable and confirm our theoretical predictions. While we do not report results for these two alternative models in the interest of conserving space, they are available upon request.
characteristics and regulatory/capital market environments such as access to financial markets, the riskiness of business environment and the quality of regulation and governance strongly affect the demand for reinsurance. In contrast, factors which capture the countries' individuals' savings from the economic wealth category, country tax rate from the quality of regulation and governance category and measure from the competition category seem to affect the demand for risk management to a lesser extent. Hence, our results indicate that the demand for reinsurance is strongly influenced by country-level factors as well as firm-level determinants. However, our results also indicate that the stage of development of the local insurance market plays a negligible role.
Conclusion
In this paper, we view the demand for reinsurance as a "special case" of the more general problem of the corporate demand for risk management. Specifically, we analyze whether corporate risk management decisions in the form of reinsurance purchases by the global property-liability insurance industry vary across countries by examining the impact of firmand country-level factors. In addition to considering firm-level factors that are known from previous studies to influence the demand for reinsurance, we also focus attention upon the effects of the following set of country-level factors: access to financial markets, economic wealth, riskiness of business environment, quality of regulation and governance, and competition.
Using a dataset of 21,702 firm-year observations of property-liability insurance companies from 33 countries including developed and developing countries over the period 2000 through 2012, we first conduct a variance decomposition analysis to assess the importance of firm-level determinants of insurer's demand for reinsurance relative to time-invariant country fixed effects. We then analyze the ability of specific country characteristics rather than country fixed effects to explain the demand for reinsurance. Third, we analyze the impact of each country-level factor on the insurers' demand for reinsurance. Our results indicate that country-level factors explain differences in the demand for reinsurance to a large degree. In particular, the country's macro characteristics and regulatory/market environments such as access to financial markets, the riskiness of business environment and the quality of regulation and governance strongly affect the insurers' demand for reinsurance, while factors that capture the countries' individuals' savings from the economic wealth category and country tax rate from the quality of regulation and governance category seem to affect the firms'
demand for reinsurance to a lesser extent. Moreover, our results indicate that the stage of development of the local insurance market plays a negligible role.
We contribute to the literature by providing evidence that in addition to firm-level determinants, country-level factors have an economically as well as statistically significant effect upon the demand for reinsurance. Specifically, we find that country-level factors explain more than half of the variation in the global demand for reinsurance, whereas firm-level determinants explain less than half.
